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STUDENT NOTES
CpmINAL L A W- LARCENY - NECESSAny ELEMENTS. - Appellant
Wright was convicted of stealing chickens. The instructions of the
lower court did not require the jury to believe that the chickens were
taken from the owner with the intent to permanently deprive him of
them. The case did not hold that this was reversible error but the
court stated that the word "permanently" should be used in the instruc-
tion upon the next trial as it is part of the old common law definition
of larceny that the taking must be with the intent to permanently
deprive the owner of the property so taken. Also the instructions of
the court below did not require the jury to believe that appellant took
the chickens with the intent to convert them to his own use. The
court held upon this instruction that it is a necessary element of lar-
ceny that the person taking the property must have done so with the
intent" to convert it to his own use and that the instruction was there-
fore erroneous. Wright v. Commonwealth, 33 S. W. (2nd) 645.
It is generally held, in Kentucky and in other jurisdictions that
the intent to deprive permanently is an indispensable component of
larceny. Stewart v. Commonwealth, 191 Ky. 538, 230 S. W. 950; Ford
v. Commonwealth, 175 Iy. 126, 193 S. W. 1026; State v. South, 28 N. J. L.
28, 75 Am. Dec. 250; Keety v. State, 14 Ind. 36; Witt v. State, E Mo. 671.
It is true that the court does not decide that the omission of the word
"permanently" is reversible error. But there were other grounds for
reversal upon which the court could base its opinion without meeting
the issuer squarely, and it is the opinion of the writer that, since the
word is a part of the old common law definition of larceny and since it
is so generally held that there must be a permanent deprivation, if the
court were to be met with the issue and should be forced to decide
whether or not this were erroneous, it would hold that the omission of
the word "Permanently" from the instruction is reversible error.
The prevailing rule in Kentucky and in some other jurisdictions
is that the taking must be with the intent to convert the thing taken
to the taker's own use. Alexander v. Commonwealth, 14 Ky. 290, 20
S. W. 254; Ford v. Commonwealth, 175 Ky. 126, 193 S. W. 1026;
Groover v. State, 82 Fla. 427, 90 S. 473, 26 A. L. R. 375. However, it is
not necessary that the benefit be of a pecuniary nature; it is sufficient
if some service or benefit is derived therefrom. Lopez v. State, 46 Tex.
Cr. 473, 80 S. W. 1016; State v. Welman, 34 Minn. 221, 25 N. W. 395.
By the weight of authority however, it is not necessary that the
taking be for the sake of gain, as long as the owner will be permanently
deprived of the thing taken. Best v. State, 155 Ind. 46, 57 N. E. 534;
Del. v. State, 63 Miss. 77, 60 Am. Rep. 46; State v. Ryan, 12 Nev. 401,
28 Am Rep. 802; Dignowitty v. State, 17 Tex. 521, 67 Am. Dec. 670.
Upon the other elements of larceny there seems to be very little
difference of opinion. The taking must be wrongful and by trespass
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but need not be by stealth, if the criminal intent is apparent. But
regardless of its nature, there must always be a taking. Alexander v.
Commonwealth, 14 Ky. 290, 20 S. W. 254; Ross v. Commonwealth, 14 Ky.
259, S3 S. W. 214. It may be by a non-human agency, i. e. not neces-
sarily with the hands. Commonwealth v. Shaw, 4 Allen (Mass.) 308,
81 Am. Dec. 706. The taking must also be without the owner's consent.
State v. England, 8 Jones (N. C.) 399, 80 Am. Dec. 334.
There must be some asportation or carrying away of the property
and it must be under the dominion and control of the trespasser, even
though it be but for an instant. Adams v. Commonwealth, 153 Ky. 88,
154 S. W. 381; Thompson v. State, 94 Ala. 535, 10 S. 520, 33 Am. St.
Rep. 145.
Since Larceny at common law was confined to goods and chattels,
it is now the rule that the thing taken must be personal property.
Blackburn v. Clark, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 659, 41 S. IV. 430. It must be some-
thing the law regards as property and of some value, but the least
value to the owner is sufficient. Wilson v. State, 1 Port. (Ala.) 118;
Commonwealth v. Cabot, 241 Mass. 131, 135 N. E. 465.
For there to be larceny the goods taken must be the property of
another than the taker. Love v. State, 78 Ga. 66, 3 S. E. 893. Special
property in another is sufficient and possession is enough as against
others than the owner. Ward v. People, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 395; Triplett v.
Commonwealth, 28 Ky. at 978, 91 S. W. 281; Commonwealth v. Rourke,
10 Cush. (Mass.) 397, 399.
Lastly, there must be a felonious intent or animus furandi which
exists both at the time of taking and of carrying away. State v.
Holmes, 17 Mo. 379, 57 Am. Dec. 269. Taking by mistake is not lar-
ceny. Criswell v. State, 24 Tex. App. 606, 7 S. W. 337. Neither is it
larceny to take under a bona fide claim of ownership no matter how
unfounded. Ross v. Commonwealth (Ky.) 20 S. W. 214; People v.
Schultz, 71 Mich. 315, 38 N. W. 868; Triplett v. Commonwealth, 28 Ky.
974, 91 S. W. 281. Ignorance here does not excuse as it might seem,
but it does negative a criminal intent.
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NEGLIGENCE-LIAILITY OF MANUFACTURER TO USER OF GooDs.-Plain-
tiff purchased a bottle of pop in X's place of business and drank part
of its contents. A quantity of arsenic troxide wrapped in tinfoil was
in the bottle; as a consequence plaintiff became ill and received perma-
nent internal injuries. Judgment for the plaintiff was reversed on the
ground that plaintiff failed to show that X procured the pop from the
defendant. However the following rule of law was laid down by the
court: "One who puts articles inherently or intrinsically dangerous
to life on the market owes the duty of care to all those persons who
ought to have been reasonably foreseen as likely to use them". Nehi
.Bottling Company v. Thomas, 236 Ky. 684, 33 S. NV.* (2nd) 701 (1930).
The liability of manufacturers or vendors to the ultimate user of
articles was first recognized in its present form of application in Judge
Sanborn's decision in Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120
